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THE WOOLLARD DECISION AND THE  
LESSONS OF THE TRAYVON MARTIN TRAGEDY 
DENNIS A. HENIGAN∗
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On March 2, 2012, Judge Benson Everett Legg of the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland ventured where oth-
er courts repeatedly had refused to go and became the first federal 
judge to hold there is a Second Amendment right to carry a gun out-
side the home.  He therefore found unconstitutional Maryland’s sta-
tutory requirement that an individual must have a “good and substan-
tial reason” for the issuance of a permit to carry a handgun in public.  
Judge Legg’s opinion in Woollard v. Sheridan1 goes to extraordinary 
lengths to read into the Supreme Court’s landmark 2008 opinion Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller2 imagined evidence of a constitutional right 
to carry lethal weapons in public, while ignoring the repeated indica-
tions in Heller that the Court was presented with, and deciding, only 
the issue of a right to gun possession in the home.3
 
Copyright © 2012 by Dennis A. Henigan. 
 
∗ Vice President, Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, and author of Lethal Logic: 
Exploding the Myths That Paralyze American Gun Policy (2009).  The author is grateful for the 
helpful suggestions of Jonathan Lowy and Daniel Vice of the Brady Center’s Legal Action 
Project, and for the research assistance of Robyn Long.  
 1. No. L-10-2068, 2012 WL 695674 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012).   
 2. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 3. In recent years, numerous courts, both federal and state, have refused to find in 
Heller a Second Amendment right to carry guns in public.  See, e.g., Baker v. Kealoha, No. 
11-00528 (D. Haw. Apr. 30, 2012); Piszczatsoski v. Filko, No. 10-06110 (WHW), 2012 WL 
104917 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2012); Moore v. Madigan, No. 11-cv-03134, 2012 WL 344760 (C.D. 
Ill. Feb. 3, 2012); United States v. Laurent, No. 11-CR-322, 2011 WL 6004606 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 2, 2011); Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Richard v. County 
of Yolo, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Gonzalez v. Vill. of W. Milwaukee, No. 
09CV0384, 2010 WL 1904977 (E.D. Wis. May 11, 2010); United States v. Hart, 726 F. Supp. 
2d 56 (D. Mass. 2010); United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d 580 (S.D.W.Va. 2010); Wil-
liams v. State, 417 Md. 479, 10 A.3d 1167 (2011); People v. Dawson, 934 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2010); State v. Knight, 218 P.3d 1177 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).  Of these rulings, per-
haps the most intriguing is the unpublished opinion in Jennings v. McCraw, No. 5:10-CV-
141-C (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2012) (order granting defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment).  In upholding the Texas statute setting twenty-one as the minimum age for carrying 
a concealed weapon in that state, Judge Sam R. Cummings held that the relief sought by 
plaintiffs, the right to carry a handgun outside the home, “seems to be beyond the scope 
of the core Second Amendment concern articulated in Heller.”  Id., slip op. at 9.  He re-
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Only days before Judge Legg’s ruling, an unarmed Florida tee-
nager named Trayvon Martin was shot and killed by a citizen on 
neighborhood watch who was legally carrying a loaded and concealed 
semi-automatic pistol.  Although there is no reason to believe Judge 
Legg knew of the Trayvon Martin shooting when he issued his un-
precedented ruling, the shooting provided the nation with dramatic 
evidence of the human cost of Judge Legg’s newly discovered consti-
tutional right.   
Although much about Trayvon Martin’s tragic shooting has be-
come a matter of national controversy, certain key facts are clear at 
this writing.  Martin’s killer, George Zimmerman, was legally carrying 
a loaded and concealed semi-automatic pistol as he performed his 
neighborhood watch duties on February 26.4  Around seven o’clock 
that evening, Zimmerman called police to report a “suspicious” per-
son in the gated community Retreat at Twin Lakes in Sanford.5  That 
person was Trayvon Martin.  After telling the police dispatcher that he 
was following Martin, Zimmerman was told “we don’t need you to do 
that.”6  He defied this advice and continued to pursue Martin.  An al-
tercation occurred, during which Martin was shot dead.7
It turned out that Martin was returning from a convenience store 
where he had purchased a bag of Skittles and a can of iced tea.
   
8
 
fused to extend the Heller right beyond the home “[a]bsent further guidance from control-
ling authority” and found the proper remedy for plaintiffs to be “legislative in nature, not 
judicial.” Id., slip op. at 11–12.  Judge Cummings, it turns out, is no faint-hearted defender 
of Second Amendment rights.  In 1999, he became the first federal judge to hold that the 
Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to gun possession, not simply a militia-
related right, a position ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in Heller.  See United 
States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d in part, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002).  See also Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the 
Third Battle over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 707 (2012) (reviewing 
lower court decisions on gun regulations after Heller and McDonald and finding that lower 
courts have been “highly deferential to legislative determinations” and have upheld “all 
but the most drastic restrictions on guns”). 
  He 
 4. Timeline of Events in Trayvon Martin Case, CNN JUSTICE, CNN.COM, (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-04-23/justice/justice_florida-zimmerman-timeline_1_gated-
community-gunshot-martin-punches?_s=PM:JUSTICE [hereinafter CNN Timeline].  Al-
though a legal gun carrier under Florida law, Zimmerman was armed in violation of the 
neighborhood watch program rule that members “shall not carry weapons.”  Beth Kassab, 
Trayvon Martin Would Be Alive if Neighborhood Watch Rules Followed, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Mar. 14, 2012, available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-03-14/news/os-
trayvon-martin-beth-kassab-031512-20120314_1_orlando-police-block-captains-zimmerman. 
 5. CNN Timeline, supra note 4. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Lizette Alvarez, Justice Department Investigation Is Sought in Florida Teenager’s Shooting 
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2012, at A10. 
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was unarmed.9  Zimmerman, who has claimed he acted in self-defense 
after he was attacked by Martin, has been charged with second-degree 
murder.10
The criminal justice system will sort through the competing ac-
counts of this tragedy.  But one conclusion seems inescapable regard-
less of which account prevails in court: If George Zimmerman had not 
had a gun when he encountered Trayvon Martin, the young man like-
ly would be alive today.  It is improbable that an unarmed Zimmer-
man would have ventured into the night to follow a man he deemed 
suspicious enough to warrant a call to the police.  It is therefore likely 
that Zimmerman would have followed the dispatcher’s advice against 
following Martin and the police presumably would have handled the 
situation.  Even if Zimmerman had followed Martin, and even if a 
confrontation had occurred between them, without the gun it proba-
bly would not have been fatal.   
 
Moreover, George Zimmerman had a gun because Florida law al-
lowed it.11  Although Zimmerman had once been subject to a restrain-
ing order and had been involved in an altercation with police,12
II.  A CALL FOR CAUTION IGNORED 
 he 
was able to get a concealed weapons permit in Florida.  It also seems 
safe to say that, were it not legal for him to do so, Zimmerman would 
not have carried a gun.  In spite of his violent past, his involvement in 
a neighborhood watch program suggests he saw himself as a “law ab-
iding citizen” responsible for protecting his community.  It is hardly 
an overstatement to say that Trayvon Martin lost his life because Flor-
ida has created a statutory right to carry guns in public, precisely the 
right Judge Legg’s ruling would constitutionalize.  
There is no reason to believe Judge Legg knew of the Trayvon 
Martin shooting when he issued his unprecedented ruling.  What is 
extraordinary about his decision is that the higher court whose deci-
sions Judge Legg is bound to follow—the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit—had issued, one year earlier, a powerful 
call for judicial restraint on the issue of public gun carrying, precisely 
 
 9. CNN Timeline, supra note 4. 
 10. Lizette Alvarez & Michael Cooper, Prosecutor Files Charge of 2nd-Degree Murder in 
Shooting of Martin, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2012, at A1. 
 11. See FLA. STAT. § 790.06 (West 2011) (making it lawful to carry concealed weapons 
or firearms if granted a license by the state, a fairly simple process). 
 12. Chris Francescani, George Zimmerman: Prelude to the Shooting of Trayvon Martin, 
REUTERS, Apr. 25, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-usa-
florida-shooting-zimmerman-idUSBRE83O18H20120425. 
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because the issue is literally one of life and death.  In his determina-
tion to expand gun rights, Judge Legg ignored the Fourth Circuit’s 
wise counsel, as he distorted the Heller ruling beyond recognition.  
The Fourth Circuit’s commentary about judicial restraint in 
Second Amendment cases arose in United States v. Masciandaro,13 in 
which a three-judge panel of the court upheld a conviction for pos-
sessing a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle in a national park.  Al-
though the panel unanimously upheld the conviction, a two-judge 
majority found it unnecessary to decide whether the Heller right ex-
tends beyond the home, concluding that the federal statute barring 
possession of guns in national parks would be constitutional even if 
the Second Amendment applied.14  Judge Niemeyer wrote separately 
to argue his minority view that such a right to carry outside the home 
exists under Heller.15
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, writing for the majority position 
that the scope of Heller need not be resolved in the case at hand, con-
cluded that “[o]n the question of Heller’s applicability outside the 
home environment, we think it prudent to await direction from the 
[Supreme] Court itself.”
  
16
There simply is no need in this litigation to break ground 
that our superiors have not tread.  To the degree that we 
push the right beyond what the Supreme Court in Heller de-
clared to be its origin, we circumscribe the scope of popular 
governance, move the action into court, and encourage liti-
gation in contexts that we cannot foresee.  This is serious 
business.  We do not wish to be even minutely responsible for some 
unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in the peace of our judi-
cial chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment rights.  It 
is not far-fetched to think the Heller Court wished to leave open the 
possibility that such a danger would rise exponentially as one moved 
the right from the home to the public square.
  In a remarkable passage, written a year be-
fore the Trayvon Martin shooting, yet prescient in light of that trage-
dy, Judge Wilkinson recognized the high stakes in Second Amend-
ment litigation: 
17
 
 13. 638 F.3d 458 (2011). 
 
 14. Id. at 459–60.  
 15. Id. at 463 (Niemeyer, J., concurring). 
 16. Id. at 475 (majority opinion). 
 17. Id. at 475–76 (emphasis added). 
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He concluded, “If ever there was an occasion for restraint, this 
would seem to be it.  There is much to be said for a course of simple 
caution.”18
This passage is not simply an argument that a constitutional issue 
should be avoided because it is not necessary to the resolution of a 
particular case.  It also is an argument that the public safety conse-
quences of extending the Heller right to the public square may be so 
dire that only the Supreme Court should undertake such a far-
reaching step.  One cannot escape the thought that tragedies like the 
Trayvon Martin shooting may be exactly the “mayhem” Judge Wilkin-
son feared. 
 
Remarkably, though the Woollard opinion purports to be “mind-
ful” of the admonitions of the Masciandaro majority,19 Judge Legg 
proceeded to defy Judge Wilkinson’s call for “caution” and “restraint.”  
Instead, Judge Legg relied on Judge Niemeyer’s minority opinion in 
Masciandaro to find a new Second Amendment right to carry guns 
outside the home.20  In Woollard, Judge Legg found Judge Niemeyer’s 
Masciandaro concurrence “both sound and persuasive” in concluding 
that the Heller right “does not stop at one’s front door.”21
III.  JUDGE NIEMEYER’S MISREADING OF HELLER 
  Judge Nie-
meyer’s Masciandaro opinion is neither “sound” nor “persuasive,” and 
Judge Legg’s reliance on it was badly misplaced. 
In attempting to extend the Heller right to carrying guns in pub-
lic, Judge Niemeyer at no point acknowledges the express statements 
in Heller defining the narrow issue posed, and resolved, in that case.  
Dick Heller brought suit challenging the District of Columbia’s refus-
al to issue him a registration certificate “for a handgun that he wished 
 
 18. Id. at 476. 
 19. See Woollard v. Sheridan, No. L-10-2068, 2012 WL 695674, at ∗6 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 
2012) (“[T]his Court is mindful of Judge Wilkinson’s admonition that one should venture 
into the unmapped reaches of Second Amendment jurisprudence ‘only upon necessity 
and only then by small degree.’” (quoting Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475)). 
 20. Id. (“In undertaking this imposing task, the Court finds a ready guide in Judge 
Niemeyer's analysis in Masciandaro. While a majority of the panel found that Judge Nie-
meyer’s reasoning was not essential to disposition of the case, it is both sound and persua-
sive.”).  Although the Woollard court was the first federal court to find a Second Amend-
ment right to carry a gun in public, subsequently the court in United States v. Weaver 
similarly relied on Judge Niemeyer’s Masciandaro opinion and ignored Judge Wilkinson’s 
majority opinion in that case, to extend the Heller right beyond the home.  No. 2:09-cr-
00222, 2012 WL 727488, at ∗4 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 6, 2012) (“[T]he Court finds entirely per-
suasive Judge Niemeyer’s separate opinion . . . .”). 
 21. Woollard, 2012 WL 695674, at ∗6.    
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to keep at home,”22 thus denying him the right to possess a handgun in 
his home.  In addition, he challenged the District’s separate licensing 
requirement “insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a firearm in the 
home without a license.”23  The Supreme Court held “that the District’s 
ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second Amend-
ment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in 
the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”24  The 
Court thus ordered the District to permit Heller “to register his hand-
gun and . . . issue him a license to carry it in the home.”25
The issue posed, and resolved, in Heller was the right to have an 
operable handgun in the home.  At no point did the Court state it was 
deciding the constitutional status of carrying guns in public places.  
As Justice Scalia’s majority opinion put it, the Second Amendment 
“elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”
   
26  He concluded that 
“enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy 
choices off the table . . . includ[ing] the absolute prohibition of 
handguns held and used for self-defense in the home.”27
Despite Heller’s express definition of the issue as involving only 
the keeping and bearing of arms in the home, Judge Niemeyer relies 
on the thinnest of reeds to find a broader right embedded in Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion.  He notes, for example, Justice Scalia’s ref-
erence to the right as “protecting against both public and private vi-
olence” and infers that such language extends the right “to wherever 
a person could become exposed to public or private violence.”
 
28
Surely this reads far too much into Justice Scalia’s phrase.  There 
is no indication that Justice Scalia was speaking of the physical loca-
tion of where the right would be exercised; that is, whether it could 
be exercised only on private property or “in public” as well.  Rather, 
the reference occurs in Part II of the Heller majority opinion, which 
concerns the question of whether the Second Amendment protects 
only a militia-related right—involving “public violence”—or rather in-
   
 
 22. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008)(emphasis added). 
 23. Id. at 576 (emphasis added). 
 24. Id. at 635 (emphasis added). 
 25. Id. (emphasis added). 
 26. Id. (emphasis added).  It is surely significant that, in arguing for the unique self-
defensive value of handguns, Justice Scalia relied on the “many reasons that a citizen may 
prefer a handgun for home defense.”  Id. at 629.  No mention was made of their value for 
self-defense in public places. 
 27. Id. at 636 (emphasis added). 
 28. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (2011) (Niemeyer, J., concurring) 
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 594) (alteration omitted)). 
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cludes an individual right to use arms to defend against “private”—
that is, non-public—“violence.”29  Indeed, Justice Scalia’s reference to 
“public and private violence” is immediately followed by a brief dis-
cussion of violence involving the State—specifically actions by the 
Crown in the 1760s and 1770s to “disarm the inhabitants of the most 
rebellious areas” that “provoked polemical reactions by Americans in-
voking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms.”30  Since Justice Scalia 
had previously defined “keep arms” as equivalent to “have weapons,”31 
his reference to “public violence” seems to refer to efforts by a tyran-
nical government to disarm the people (which, according to Justice 
Scalia, is how “tyrants eliminated a militia”),32
Judge Niemeyer also cites language in Heller referring to “the in-
dividual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confronta-
tion,”
 rather than to violence 
in public places, as opposed to private homes.   
33 but this sentence also occurs in Part II of the majority opinion 
to support Justice Scalia’s conclusion that the right guaranteed by the 
Second Amendment was an individual right to have guns for self-
defense, as opposed to being entirely a militia-related right.34  At no 
point does the Heller opinion hold that the right extends to any place 
a “confrontation” might occur.35
Judge Niemeyer’s concurrence further characterizes Heller as 
holding that the Second Amendment right was “understood to exist 
not only for self-defense, but also for membership in a militia and for 
   
 
 29. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 593–94 (“It was clearly an individual right, having nothing 
whatever to do with service in a militia. . . .  Thus, the right secured in 1689 . . . was by the 
time of the founding understood to be an individual right protecting against both public 
and private violence.”).   
 30. Id. at 594. 
 31. Id. at 582. 
 32. Id. at 598. 
 33. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 
592). 
 34. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 35. Likewise, Judge Niemeyer reads far too much into the Heller Court’s observation 
that the home is “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute,” 
which he reads as “suggesting that some form of the right applies where that need is not 
‘most acute.’”  Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (quoting Heller, 554 
U.S. at 628).  Once the context is understood, however, Judge Niemeyer’s inference falls 
apart.  The Supreme Court’s reference to the “acute” need for self-defense in the home is 
part of its explanation of why the District of Columbia handgun law is unconstitutional; 
that is, the Court found the handgun ban unconstitutional because it “extends . . . to the 
home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”  Heller, 554 
U.S. at 628.  In no way does this suggest a constitutional right to carry a gun for self-
defense where the need is less acute; indeed, the Court’s words underscore that, for the 
Heller Court, the fatal flaw in the D.C. handgun ban is that it applied to the possession of 
handguns at home. 
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hunting, neither of which is a home-bound activity.”36  As to “mem-
bership in a militia,” according to Heller’s definition of “militia,” this 
can be entirely a home-bound activity.  Indeed, Heller defines the mili-
tia simply as the pool of “all able-bodied men” from which Congress 
has the power to organize an effective fighting force should it choose 
to do so.37  Under this view, one can be an armed militiaman without 
ever leaving one’s home.  The impetus for the codification of the 
right to keep and bear arms in the Constitution, according to Justice 
Scalia, was the lesson of history “that the way tyrants had eliminated a 
militia consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by banning the 
militia but simply by taking away the people’s arms.”38  The Second 
Amendment assures the preservation of this unorganized armed mili-
tia, according to Heller, by guaranteeing the right to have a gun in the 
home, and the “central component” of that right is self-defense.39
Likewise, Judge Niemeyer’s reference to hunting gives the mis-
leading impression that Heller found a constitutional right to use guns 
in hunting activities, whereas Heller held nothing of the kind.  Actually 
    
 
 36. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 
599). 
 37. Heller, 554 U.S. at 596.  Although this is the concept of the militia adopted in Heller, 
Justice Scalia’s opinion is deeply flawed in its conclusion that the “well regulated Militia” 
referenced in the Second Amendment is nothing but the unorganized pool of able-bodied 
men.  In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, during the Founding Era the militia existed only 
to the extent it was organized and the Second Amendment guarantees a right to be armed 
only in service to a militia organized and administered under government authority.  See 
Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1190 (2009).  The defi-
ciencies in the Heller majority’s conception of the “well regulated Militia” are skillfully pre-
sented in Justice Stevens’s dissent.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 641–44, 647–62 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).  My argument here is that, under Heller’s historically erroneous concept of the 
militia, one can keep and bear arms as a member of the militia without ever leaving one’s 
home.  
 38. Heller, 554 U.S. at 598 (majority opinion). 
 39. Id. at 599 (emphasis omitted).  Under Justice Scalia’s view of the militia, it would 
seem obvious that once Congress organizes the militia into an actual “fighting force,” per-
formance of militia activities would occur largely outside the home.  However, carrying a 
gun in public as part of such a government-organized fighting force surely cannot be re-
garded as a private right to be enforced against government intrusion.  Indeed, such pub-
lic carrying of guns would be undertaken as a duty owed the government, subject to ple-
nary regulation by the government under the provisions of the Militia Clauses of the 
Constitution, which divide authority over the militia between Congress and the states.  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16.  As one commentator on the Heller right has put it, “the 
Second Amendment contemplates a people’s militia composed of all citizens, who each 
have an individual right to bear arms,” but “[o]nce the people have begun to gather in the 
streets,” they become subject to the Militia Clauses and other provisions of the Constitu-
tion, which “require that the people’s militia be regulated and subordinated to state or 
federal officials.”  Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second 
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1319–20 (2009).  Nothing in the Heller majority opi-
nion is in tension with this view.   
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the passage in Heller cited in the Niemeyer concurrence40 merely says 
that Americans of the Founding Era valued the “ancient right of indi-
viduals to keep and bear arms” not only to preserve the citizen militia, 
but also for purposes of “self-defense and hunting.”41  This passage 
makes the obvious point that guns kept in the home as an exercise of 
the Second Amendment right may well be useful for both self-defense 
and hunting.  But this is far from holding that there is a constitutional 
right to use a gun to hunt, particularly since, as explained above, the 
only issue posed and resolved in Heller was the right to have a hand-
gun in the home for self-defense.  Mr. Heller never asserted that the 
District’s handgun ban limited his hunting activities.  Moreover, the 
Heller Court’s analysis of whether handguns are constitutionally pro-
tected turned entirely on their utility for self-defense in the home, 
with no mention of their utility for hunting.42
Perhaps the least defensible part of Judge Niemeyer’s opinion is 
his reliance
 
43 on a portion of the Heller decision in which the Supreme 
Court provides assurances that a host of gun restrictions are entirely 
compatible with the Second Amendment right.  The Court begins this 
discussion with the observation that the Second Amendment right “is 
not unlimited.”44
 
 40. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring). 
  Marshaling historical support for the limited nature 
of the right, the Court finds that “[f]rom Blackstone through the 
19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that 
the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in 
 41. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. 
 42. One may also argue that the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010), incorporating the Second Amendment as a restraint 
on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, contains passages suggesting a right 
extending beyond the home.  For example, at one point in Justice Alito’s plurality opi-
nion, he describes the holding of Heller in these terms: “the Second Amendment protects a 
personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense.”  
Id. at 3044.  The Woollard opinion seems to suggest that this language “most notably” sup-
ports a right broader than a home-based right.  See Woollard v. Sheridan, No. L-10-2068, 
2012 WL 695674, at ∗6 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012) (arguing that the proposition that the 
Second Amendment right “does not stop at one’s front door . . . finds additional support 
in McDonald”).  However, by its words, this passage from McDonald does not address 
whether the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is confined to the home.  It may 
simply be suggesting that guns possessed in the home for self-defense may also have other 
lawful purposes.  At various other points, the McDonald plurality describes the Heller right 
narrowly: “In Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a 
handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense.”  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.  
Moreover, as in Heller, the law challenged in McDonald was a city ordinance banning the 
possession of handguns in the home; no issue was raised as to restrictions on guns in pub-
lic places.  Id. at 3026–27. 
 43. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (Niemeyer, J., concurring). 
 44. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
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any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”45  The Court then 
furnishes a historical example of the limited nature of the right, not-
ing that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the ques-
tion held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were law-
ful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”46
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on 
the commercial sale of arms.
  Disavowing 
any intention of undertaking “an exhaustive historical analysis today 
of the full scope of the Second Amendment,” the Court nevertheless 
cautioned: 
47
The Court added in a footnote: “We identify these presumptively law-
ful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to 
be exhaustive.”
   
48
According to Judge Niemeyer, however, because the Heller Court 
found that laws restricting the carrying of firearms in “sensitive places 
such as schools and government buildings,” are presumptively lawful, 
this must mean there is a right to carry guns in non-sensitive places.  
“If the Second Amendment right were confined to self-defense in the 
home,” he wrote, “the Court would not have needed to express a reser-
vation for ‘sensitive places’ outside of the home.”
 
49
This inference would be valid only if the Heller Court, in the rele-
vant passage, was providing an exhaustive list of gun restrictions that 
continue to be valid under the newly recognized right, with the impli-
cation that restrictions not on the list are now constitutionally suspect.  
But, of course, the Court expressly cautions that its list “does not 
purport to be exhaustive.”
 
50
 
 45. Id. 
  Judge Niemeyer simply ignores that lan-
guage and reads Heller as stating precisely the opposite.  It also is sig-
nificant that the Supreme Court specifically references laws banning 
the carrying of concealed weapons—a substantial restriction on guns 
outside the home—as a historical example of the kind of gun restric-
tion put in no jeopardy by the newly recognized Second Amendment 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 626–27. 
 48. Id. at 627 n.26. 
 49. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (2011) (Niemeyer, J., concurring). 
 50. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
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right.  This explicit reference to concealed carry bans also is ignored 
by Judge Niemeyer.   
Given that the Heller Court was presented only with the issue of 
the right to have and carry guns within the home, the Court’s refer-
ences to the continued presumptive validity of laws banning con-
cealed weapons and laws forbidding carrying guns in sensitive places 
may be taken as meaning only that such restrictions are not put in 
jeopardy by the guarantee of a right to be armed in the home.  Fur-
ther, given that the Heller Court repeatedly described its holding as 
recognizing a right to be armed in the home for self-defense, it would 
be passing strange for the Court also to have extended the right to the 
public square through the subtle indirection discerned by Judge 
Niemeyer.  As the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated in upholding 
the same Maryland statute at issue in Woollard, “[i]f the Supreme 
Court . . . meant its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will 
need to say so more plainly.”51
In addition to adopting the reasoning of Judge Niemeyer’s mi-
nority opinion in Masciandaro, the Woollard decision makes an argu-
ment for a broad reading of the Second Amendment based on Heller’s 
textual analysis of the Second Amendment.  Judge Legg asserts that 
Heller’s definition of “bear” as meaning “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon 
the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of be-
ing armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of con-
flict with another person” itself supports a broader right.
 
52
Therefore, contrary to the conclusions of Judge Niemeyer in 
Masciandaro and Judge Legg in Woollard, there is no sound basis to 
read Heller as standing for a right to be armed outside the home.    
  But this 
definition does not address where the wearing or carrying must occur 
to receive constitutional protection.  As noted, Heller itself contem-
plates the possibility of carrying a gun only within the home because it 
ordered that Mr. Heller receive a license to do just that.  
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF A RIGHT TO BE ARMED IN PUBLIC 
In Masciandaro, writing for the majority, Judge Wilkinson spoke 
of the possibility that the danger of mayhem from gunfire could “rise 
exponentially as one moved the right from the home to the public 
 
 51. Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479, 496, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (2011). 
 52. Woollard v. Sheridan, No. L-10-2068, 2012 WL 695674, at ∗6 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012) 
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 584) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
 2012] THE LESSONS OF THE TRAYVON MARTIN TRAGEDY 1199 
square.”53  In fact, as a matter of both public policy and history, ex-
tending the Heller right to the public square would be a radical step 
with far-reaching consequences for public safety and for the nature of 
the communities in which we live.54
The fundamental problem is that there is no way to guarantee 
that guns will be used only for the salutary purpose of self-defense.  
Indeed, there is compelling empirical evidence that the exercise of 
the Heller right to keep a gun in the home for self-defense actually in-
creases the risk of harm to individuals exercising the right, to their 
families, and to others who may visit the home.  One study shows that, 
for every time a gun in the home is used in a self-defense shooting, 
there are four unintentional shootings (often involving young child-
ren), seven criminal assaults (often involving domestic disputes), and 
eleven completed or attempted suicides.
  
55  Moreover, since guns are 
undeniably more lethal than other weapons,56 it is hardly surprising 
that the presence of a gun in the home is associated with a threefold 
increase in the risk of homicide57 and a fivefold increase in the risk of 
suicide.58
 
 53. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 476. 
   
 54. In arguing that extending the Heller right to public places would be a radical step, 
it should be recognized that there may be some limited public carrying of guns that is re-
garded as essential to the exercise of the more limited right to have and use a gun in the 
home for self-defense.  This could include transporting the gun from a gun store to home, 
taking a gun to be repaired, and so on.  These activities may well be constitutionally pro-
tected as a necessary corollary to the Heller home-based right.  Thus, for example, the Se-
venth Circuit struck down Chicago’s ban on firing ranges within the city on the ground 
that the city itself had made granting a license to possess a gun in the home conditioned 
on completion of a firearm-safety course that included range-training.  Ezell v. Chicago, 
651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).  Thus, “[t]he effect of the ordinance is another complete 
ban on gun ownership within City limits.”  Id. at 712 (Rovner, J., concurring).  Ezell did not 
call into question restrictions on public gun carrying, as long as residents are able to 
transport guns to a range in order to fulfill the requirements for exercising the Heller right 
to a gun in the home for self-defense. 
 55. Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Injuries and Deaths Due to Firearms in the Home, 45 J. 
TRAUMA 263, 265 (1998). 
 56. Linda Saltzman et al., Weapon Involvement and Injury Outcomes in Family and Intimate 
Assaults, 267 J. AMER. MED. ASS’N 3043, 3044 (1992) (domestic assaults with firearms are 
more than twelve times more deadly than assaults with all other weapons or bodily force).  
See generally DENNIS HENIGAN, LETHAL LOGIC: EXPLODING THE MYTHS THAT PARALYZE 
AMERICAN GUN POLICY 23–30 (2009). 
 57. Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide in the Home, 
329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1084, 1087 (1993).  See also Lisa M. Hepburn & David Hemenway, 
Firearm Availability and Homicide: A Review of the Literature, 9 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 
417, 422 (2004) (“[H]ouseholds with firearms are at higher risk for homicide, and there is 
no net beneficial effect of firearm ownership.”). 
 58. Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownership, 327 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 467, 470 (1992).  See also DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC 
HEALTH 39 (2004) (discussing ten studies in the previous twenty years that “all find that 
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As dangerous as the exercise of the Heller right is, at least the 
threat posed by guns kept in the home is largely confined to their 
owners, family members, friends, and houseguests.  However, firearms 
carried in public—whether carried concealed or openly—constitute a 
threat to a far greater universe of individuals, including law enforce-
ment officers, random passersby, and other private citizens.  The risk 
from an individual’s decision to carry a gun in public is borne almost 
entirely by persons who had no say in that decision and, if the carry-
ing is concealed, no knowledge of the decision.  It is axiomatic that if 
the gun carrier accidentally discharges his gun in public, decides to 
settle an argument with his gun in public, makes a mistake in judg-
ment with his gun in public, or commits a crime with his gun in pub-
lic, the community-at-large is at risk of death or serious injury from 
those actions.  To return to the Trayvon Martin case, if George Zim-
merman had left his gun at home that fateful night, the Florida tee-
nager might have been questioned by the police as a result of Zim-
merman’s neighborhood watch activity, but he would be alive today.  
It should be obvious that, as legitimate as the community’s interest in 
regulating guns to be possessed at home,59
Moreover, as much as the gun lobby and its allies would like to 
pretend that legal gun carriers are inherently “law-abiding” and there-
fore pose little risk to others, the examples of legal gun carriers com-
mitting irresponsible and criminal acts with their guns in public are 
legion.
 the public interest in regu-
lating guns in public is even more fundamental.    
60  One ongoing tabulation shows that in the last four years 
alone, legal holders of concealed carry permits from various states 
have shot and killed over 400 people, including eleven law enforce-
ment officers.61
 
firearms in the home are associated with substantially and significantly higher rates of sui-
cide”). 
  
 59. Although the risk of lethal violence from guns in the home is borne most directly 
by gun-owning households and those who visit them, it also is borne, in the aggregate, by 
communities with a high incidence of gun ownership.  See, e.g., Matthew Miller et al., State-
Level Homicide Victimization Rates in the U.S. in Relation to Survey Measures of Household Firearm 
Ownership, 2001–2003, 64 SOC. SCI. & MED. 656, 660 (2007) (“States with higher rates of 
firearm ownership had significantly higher homicide victimization rates.”); Philip J. Cook 
& Jens Ludwig, The Social Costs of Gun Ownership, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 379, 387 (2006) (“[A]n 
increase in gun prevalence causes an intensification of criminal violence—a shift toward 
greater lethality, and hence greater harm to the community.”).  
 60. See generally HENIGAN, supra note 56, at 127–31.  
 61. Concealed Carry Killers, VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, http://vpc.org/ccwkillers.htm 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2012).  These are just the instances that can be discerned from public-
ly available material.  The gun lobby has successfully worked for legislation in the states 
that blocks public access to the identities of concealed carry license holders, making it im-
possible to determine, in many cases, whether someone who committed a violent or irres-
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Even apart from examples of mayhem by legal carriers of wea-
pons, an impressive body of empirical evidence now shows that state 
laws making it easier to carry concealed weapons in public not only 
have not decreased crime rates as promised by their proponents, but 
actually have had the net effect of making those states more danger-
ous.  Ian Ayres and John J. Donohue III of Yale Law School found, for 
example, that “the evidence is most supportive of the claim that 
[right-to-carry] laws increase aggravated assault.”62  Another study 
found that laws liberalizing concealed carry “have resulted, if any-
thing, in an increase in adult homicide rates.”63  A third study found, 
similarly, “[f]or robbery, many states experience increases in crime” 
after concealed carry laws are enacted.64  There is now a robust re-
search literature debunking the claims made, primarily by economist 
John Lott, Jr., that concealed carry laws have led to substantial de-
creases in homicides, rapes, and aggravated assaults.65
It may well be that increased legal carrying of guns in public is 
leading to increased illegal gun carrying as well.  After all, two-thirds 
of prisoners incarcerated for gun offenses reported that the chance of 
encountering an armed victim was very or somewhat important in 
their own choice to use a gun.
   
66
 
ponsible act with a gun was a concealed carry license holder.  See Michael Luo, Guns in 
Public, and Out of Sight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
12/27/us/more-concealed-guns-and-some-are-in-the-wrong-hands.html?pagewanted=all 
(noting “a dwindling number of states where the identities of permit holders remain pub-
lic”). 
  In any event, the research indicates 
that even the person in possession of a gun, whether at home or in 
public, derives no net safety benefit.  Researchers at the University of 
Pennsylvania found that individuals in possession of a gun were four 
to five times more likely to be shot in an assault than those not in pos-
 62. Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, More Guns, Less Crime Fails Again: The Latest Evi-
dence from 1977–2006, 6 ECON. J. WATCH 218, 220 (May 2009).  See also John J. Donohue III, 
The Impact of Concealed-Carry Laws, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND 
VIOLENCE 289–90 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (“[S]hall-issue laws are asso-
ciated with uniform increases in crime.”).   
 63. Jens Ludwig, Concealed-Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence from State Panel 
Data, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241 (1998). 
 64. Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Paul Rubin, Lives Saved or Lives Lost? The Effects of Concealed-
Handgun Laws on Crime, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 468, 472 (1998). 
 65. For a summary of the myriad scholarly attacks on Lott’s work, coming from more 
than a dozen researchers from the fields of economics, criminology, and public health, see 
HENIGAN, supra note 56, at 131–34.  Lott also contributed to this symposium.  John R. Lott, 
Jr., What a Balancing Test Will Show for Right-to-Carry Laws, 71 MD. L. REV. 1205 (2012).  
 66. Philip Cook et al., Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare 
Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1081 (2009). 
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session of a gun.67  Their study suggests several possible reasons for 
this result, including the fact that “a gun may falsely empower its pos-
sessor to overreact and instigate conflicts” or increase the owner’s risk 
of assault by entering dangerous environments that could have been 
avoided.68
The conceptual and empirical distinction between guns kept in 
the home and guns carried in public is also reflected in the Anglo-
American history of gun regulation.  The assertion by “gun rights” 
proponents of a right to bear arms in public has led to the emergence 
of substantial contrary scholarship tracing the long history of laws—in 
Great Britain and America—prohibiting and otherwise strictly regu-
lating the carrying of guns in public, whether openly or concealed.  
That tradition can be traced at least as far back as the 1328 Statute of 
Northampton, which provided that no person shall “go nor ride 
armed by Night nor by Day in Fairs, Markets, nor in the Presence of 
the Justices or other Ministers nor in no Part elsewhere.”
  This description cannot help but remind us of George 
Zimmerman, although in his case Trayvon Martin paid the ultimate 
price for the armed Zimmerman’s aggressive conduct leading directly 
to the confrontation with the unarmed teen.  
69  Indeed, 
Blackstone, cited frequently by the Heller majority, relied on the sta-
tute in noting that throughout England, “riding or going armed, with 
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by 
terrifying the good people of the land.”70
The tradition of restricting both the concealed and the open car-
ry of firearms in public places traveled across the Atlantic and was re-
flected in various state laws immediately following the ratification of 
the Constitution,
   
71 other state laws enacted throughout the nine-
teenth century,72 court decisions upholding those state laws,73
 
 67. Charles C. Branas et al., Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession and Gun Assault, 
99 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 2034, 2037 (2009). 
 and 
 68. Id. at 2037.  Another highly relevant body of research suggests that people who car-
ry guns outside the home are disproportionately likely to be aggressive.  Two studies of 
drivers, in Arizona and across the nation, show that drivers who carried guns in their cars 
were far more likely to engage in “road rage” behaviors like making obscene gestures, curs-
ing, tailgating, or blocking other drivers than drivers not carrying guns.  Matthew Miller et 
al., “Road Rage” in Arizona: Armed and Dangerous, 34 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 807 
(2002); David Hemenway et al., Is an Armed Society a Polite Society? Guns and Road Rage, 38 
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 687 (2006).  
 69. 2 Edw. 3, c.3 (1328).   
 70. Miller, supra note 39, at 1318. 
 71. Patrick J. Charles, Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus Ahis-
torical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), manuscript at 30, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1938950. 
 72. ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA 169 (2011). 
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even local laws in some of the most notorious cattle towns of the so-
called “Wild West.”74
V.  CONCLUSION 
  A thorough exploration of the historical tradi-
tion of restrictions on public gun carrying is beyond the scope of this 
Essay, but suffice it to say that many “longstanding” restrictions on 
such public carrying went far beyond the “prohibitions on carrying 
concealed weapons” noted by Justice Scalia in Heller.  
The stakes in Second Amendment litigation are inherently high.  
When it comes to the question of guns in public places, moreover, it 
is difficult to conceive of many constitutional issues with such pro-
found consequences.  A Supreme Court decision extending the Heller 
right to the public carry of guns could severely limit the authority of 
the people, through their elected representatives, to protect them-
selves against the threat of gun violence most likely to affect them-
selves and their families as they go about their daily lives.  Particularly 
for the two-thirds of Americans who have chosen not to have guns in 
their homes,75
Trayvon Martin died because Florida’s elected leaders made the 
ill-considered choice to make it easy for individuals like George Zim-
merman to carry a concealed and loaded gun in public.  But at least it 
was a choice made through the democratic process and it is a choice 
the democratic process could one day change.  States that have made 
different choices, opting for restrictive carrying laws that would never 
have allowed George Zimmerman to legally carry a concealed gun, 
should be entitled to have those choices respected by the courts.  As 
noted above, nothing in our longstanding legal tradition suggests that 
 their risk of death or injury from guns largely origi-
nates on public streets and in public places.  It would be a radical step 
indeed were the courts to begin nullifying the judgments of commun-
ities as to how best to ameliorate that threat and ensure the safety of 
their citizens.   
 
 73. English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1871); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874); Fife v. State, 
31 Ark. 455 (1876); State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367 (1891). 
 74. For example, it was not uncommon for towns of the “Wild West” to require visitors 
to check their guns at various entry points to town.  There is, in fact, photographic evi-
dence of a huge billboard posted in the middle of the main road to Dodge City around 
1879 stating, “The Carrying of Firearms Strictly Prohibited.”  WINKLER, supra note 72, at 
165. 
 75. A Shrinking Minority, The Continuing Decline of Gun Ownership in America, VIOLENCE 
POLICY CENTER, http://www.vpc.org/studies/ownership.pdf (2011) (reporting 2010 Gen-
eral Social Survey results showing 32.3 percent of American households have guns, a 40 
percent drop since 1977). 
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such a grave, life-and-death issue should be decided by courts instead 
of legislatures. 
Moreover, it is not simply a matter of allowing our elected repre-
sentatives to determine the best way to protect families and communi-
ties from harm.  It also is a question of allowing the people to deter-
mine the kind of community, and indeed nation, in which they want 
to live.  One national survey asked: “If more people in your communi-
ty begin to carry guns, will that make you feel more safe, the same, or 
less safe?”  Sixty-two percent said “less safe,” and only 12 percent said 
“more safe.”76
That, ultimately, is the wise message sent by Judge Wilkinson in 
Masciandaro and ignored by Judge Legg in Woollard.  It should be 
hoped that other courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, will heed 
it well. 
  Do we want to live in a nation where there are few, if 
any, places where we can take our families, including our children, 
and be free of loaded guns and the fear and risk they entail?  Differ-
ent people, and different communities, may come to different con-
clusions about that question, but it is a question best answered by the 
people’s elected representatives, not by the judiciary.    
 
 
 76. HEMENWAY, supra note 58, at 98. 
